| Given RMGs conclusion that Exelons current bid is not compelling enough to support splitting the board with nine dissident nominees, RMG recommends that shareholders vote on the Management Proxy (White Card), and support the re-election of all the incumbent nominees. (emphasis added) | ||
| On balance, we conclude that Exelons current bid is not compelling enough to support splitting the board with nine dissident nominees. Virtually all of the NRG shareholders to whom we spoke expressed a belief that Exelon should sweeten its offer. (emphasis added) | ||
| The downside to supporting Exelon at the annual meeting may be to embolden Exelon and to undercut NRGs negotiating leverage, with the net result a failure to maximize value... (emphasis added) | ||
| The nearly unanimous opinion of shareholders with whom we spoke was that the NRG management team had done an exemplary job over recent years in creating value. (emphasis added) |
| As the incumbent board has demonstrated its commitment to shareholder value not only through its willingness to engage Exelon in September 2008, but through its ongoing initiatives to improve operating efficiencies, its willingness to act on significant but short-fuse opportunities such as Reliant Retail, and its long-term strategy to strengthen the companys competitive stance in a carbon-constrained economy, we believe shareholders will be best served by re-electing the incumbent nominees. (emphasis added) | ||
| In September 2008, before the public tender offer and the proxy contest, NRG voluntarily met with Exelon to begin exploring strategic options. By its own account, NRG expected to continue those discussions at industry events in November, in the hope financial markets would have begun to calm by then. The clear implication is that, far from being entrenched, the companys management and board are open to strategic discussions which might maximize shareholder value and that the issue remains what it was last September, the question of whether Exelon will pay full value for the companys existing operations and future potential. (emphasis added) | ||
| In NRGs strategies over the past five years one sees an acute awareness of opportunity, and a deep understanding of how and where to hedge various risks. The opportunistic purchase of Reliant Retail at 1.5x average adjusted EBITDA, significantly below market valuations of 4.0x to 6.0x for similar assets is the most recent case in point. (emphasis added) |
| We find no reason to recommend for the election of the Dissident [Exelon] nominees to the NRG board of directors. In our opinion, the board and its advisors have given Exelons proposals and Offer reasonable consideration. (emphasis added) | ||
| We note that the board has not closed itself off from future discussions regarding a potential transaction with Exelon nor has it prohibited NRG shareholders from tendering their shares to Exelon under the revised Offer. Further, we note that the reelection of the incumbent director nominees does not block Exelons revised Offer. | ||
| We also believe that the election of the Dissident [Exelon] nominees could give Exelon an unnecessary advantage in a strategic transaction involving NRG. In our opinion, the election of the incumbent nominees will help ensure that the NRG board remains open to any, and all, potentially interested parties and proposals. (emphasis added) | ||
| Given that we do not believe it is in the best interests of shareholders to support Exelons nominees, we do not believe shareholders should support this expansion in the Companys board. (emphasis added) |
| We believe, as reportedly so do several significant shareholders of the Company, that Exelons revised offer of July 2 continues to undervalue the Company, thereby making furtherance of its proxy contest undesirable at this time. | ||
| We are of the view that the election of the Exelon nominees would not contribute meaningfully to the quality of the Companys board of directors. | ||
| We believe that election of the slate of director nominees presented by the management is in the best interest of Company and its shareholders. | ||
| We believe that approval of this proposal is not in the best interests of the Company and its stockholders. |
* | Permission to use quotations was neither sought nor obtained. |
Investors:
|
Media: | |
Nahla Azmy
|
Meredith Moore | |
609.524.4526
|
609.524.4522 | |
David Klein
|
Lori Neuman | |
609.524.4527
|
609.524.4525 | |
Erin Gilli
|
David Knox | |
609.524.4528
|
713.795.6106 |